We propose a new notion of signer-base intrusion-resilient (SiBIR) signatures, which generalizes and improves upon both forward-secure [And97, BM99] and key-insulated [DKXY02] signature schemes.
Previous Work
Forward Security. Forward-secure signature schemes [And97, BM99] preserve the security of past signatures even after the secret signing key has been exposed: time is divided into predefined time periods, with the signer updating his secret at the end of each time period; the adversary is unable to forge signatures for past periods even if she learns the key for the current one. In this model, nothing can be done about the future periods: once the adversary exposes the current secret, she has the same information as the signer.
Threshold and Proactive Security. An alternative approach explores the multi-party computation paradigm [Yao82, GMW87] : in threshold schemes [DF89] , the signing key is somehow shared among a number of signers, and signature generation requires a distributed computation involving some subset of them. The adversary, however, cannot generate valid signatures as long as the number of compromised signers is less than some predetermined security parameter (smaller than the number of signers needed to generate a valid signature). Proactive schemes [OY91, HJJ
+ 97] improve upon this model by allowing multiple corruptions 1.2 Our Results: Intrusion-Resilient Security
Model
We define intrusion-resilient signature schemes to combine benefits of the above three approaches. Namely, while maintaining the efficiency of non-interactive computation of signatures (not provided by threshold and proactive schemes), intrusion-resilient schemes preserve security of past and future time periods when both signer and base are compromised, though not simultaneously (not preserved by key-insulated and forwardsecure schemes), and security of past time periods in the case of simultaneous compromise (not preserved by key-insulated 4 and most proactive schemes). These points deserve some elaboration. To address potential compromise of the base key, [DKXY02] introduce a stronger version of key-insulated security, which requires that the base cannot generate signatures on its own. However, no security is guaranteed in [DKXY02] if the adversary manages to compromise both the base and the signer, even during different time periods. (In fact, the encryption scheme becomes completely insecure in such a case.) This is a serious limitation. If the user's key is compromised even just once, then the prudent thing to do would be to revoke the entire public key and erase the secrets of the home base. Otherwise, a single compromise of the home base would expose not only the future, but also all the past, messages.
In contrast, the salient feature of our new model is the guarantee that a compromise of the home base is entirely inconsequential as long as the signer's secret is not exposed at the same time. It thus has the benefits of proactive security. Moreover, our model retains the benefits of forward security even when all the secrets are compromised simultaneously.
Indeed, our intrusion-resilient model appears to provide the maximum possible security in the face of corruptions that occur.
Construction
In Section 3 we provide an efficient SiBIR signature scheme we call SiBIR1. Its signing and verifying are as efficient as in the Guillou-Quisquater (ordinary) signatures [GQ88] , requiring just two modular exponentiations with short (typically, 128-160 bits) exponents for both signing and verifying. This is as or more efficient than many of the ordinary signatures used in practice today. The construction is based on our forward-secure signature scheme [IR01] .
As for that underlying scheme [IR01] , our SiBIR1 security proof relies on the strong RSA assumption (see Section 4.1) and is in the random oracle model.
Towards Obsoletion of Certificate Revocation
On-line authentication is a common application of signatures. For example, a user establishing an authenticated connection to a web site (e.g., over SSL), must verify the web site's signature on a protocol message, as well as the web site's certificate that attests to the authenticity of the web site's public key. If the web site's secret key is compromised, the certificate needs to be revoked.
Certificate revocation, however, is a complex logistical problem that results in some of the most cumbersome aspects of public key infrastructures. The most common, though perhaps not the most efficient, mechanism is to consult a certificate revocation list (CRL), which would most likely be stored at a remote location (certificates usually include a pointer to the corresponding CRL site).
However, if the web site uses our signature scheme, then an exposed secret key would compromise the authenticity of the web site only for a limited time (which could be made less than the time required for the certificate revocation process, which is typically one day). Then the users need not check whether the site's certificate is revoked or not: by the time the revocation information could be updated, the web site would be authentic again, anyway.
Note that forward-secure signatures do not help address this problem: the web site's certificate would still have to be revoked in case of compromise. In contrast, if the web site uses intrusion-resilient signatures, the certificate would have to be revoked only in the unlikely case that the web site and its (presumably, separately protected) home base are compromised simultaneously. (We note that short-lived certificates [Mic96, GGM00] , key-insulated signatures [DKXY02] and proactive signature [OY91, HJJ
+ 97] can also be used to address certificate revocation; our solution, however, seems to provide the most security if one is interested in abandoning certificate revocation/reissuing entirely and having truly off-line certification authorities.)
Intrusion-Resilient Security Model
Our definitions are based on the definitions of key-insulated security [DKXY02] , which, in turn, are based on the definitions of forward secure [BM99] and ordinary [GMR88] signatures schemes. Before describing our model formally, we explain its differences from that of [DKXY02] .
First, in our model the home base updates its internal state at the end of each time period (in addition to sending the update information to the signer). Second, we also provide for a special refresh procedure (akin to proactivization): if a refresh is run after a compromise of one of the modules but before the compromise of the other, the information the adversary learned during the compromise becomes essentially useless, and the system remains secure (except, in the case of signer compromise, for the current time period). Moreover, because our refresh involves just one message from the home base to the signer, it can be combined with update and thus run at least every time period.
The adversary in our model is allowed the usual adaptive-chosen-message-and-time-period attack, and, additionally, can obtain the secrets from the home base and the signer for time periods of her choice. Furthermore, the adversary can intercept update and refresh messages of her choice between the base and the signer. Like in [DKXY02] , if the adversary only compromises the base (in fact, even if the base is continuously monitored by the adversary from the start), she still cannot forge signatures. Also like in [DKXY02] , if the adversary compromises the signer, then she can forge signatures only for the periods for which the secrets were obtained (either directly via signer compromise, or by combination of signer compromise and interception of some update and refresh messages). In contrast to [DKXY02] , however, our model tolerates multiple compromises of both base and signer (in arbitrary order), as long as there is a refresh between any compromise of the different modules. Moreover, the scheme still remains forward-secure, even if there is no such refresh between some compromises of the two modules.
We treat all compromises in one definition, as opposed to separately defining security against different kinds of compromises. This allows us to precisely specify the security requirements when different types of compromises (base, signer, update messages) are combined. This is in contrast to the key-insulated definitions of [DKXY02] , where compromises of the base key are considered in isolation, and compromises of key update messages are reduced to compromises of pairs of consecutive time periods 5 . The definitions below are given in the standard model, but can easily incorporate random oracles (used in our proofs).
Functional definition
We first define the functionality of the various components of the system; the security definition is given in the subsequent section. Recall that the system's secret keys may be modified in two different ways, called update and refresh. Updates change the secrets from one time period to the next (e.g. from one day to the next), changing also the period number in the signatures. In contrast, refreshes affect only the internal secrets and messages of the system, and are transparent to the verifier.
Thus we use notation SK t.r for secret key SK , where t is the time period (the number of times the key has been updated) and r is the "refresh number" (the number of times the key has been refreshed since the last update). We say t.r = t .r when t = t and r = r . Similarly, we say t.r < t .r when either t < t or t = t and r < r . We follow the convention of [BM99] , which requires key update immediately after key generation in order to obtain the keys for t = 1 (this is done merely for notational convenience, in order to make the number of time periods T equal to the number of updates, and need not affect the efficiency of an actual implementation). We also require key refresh immediately after key update in order to obtain keys for r = 1 (this is also done for convenience, and need not affect efficiency of an actual implementation; in particular, the update and refresh information that the base sends to the signer can be combined into a single message).
Definition 1. A signer-base key-evolving signature scheme is a septuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Sign, Ver ; US, UB; RB, RS) 6 :
1. Gen, the key generation algorithm. In: security parameter(s) (in unary), the total number T of time periods Out: initial signer key SKS 0.0 , initial home base key SKB 0.0 , and the public key PK .
2. Sign, the signing algorithm.
In: current signer key SKS t.r , message m Out: signature (t, sig) on m for time period t 3. Ver , the verifying algorithm In: message m, signature (t, sig) and public key PK Out: "valid" or "invalid" (as usual, signatures generated by Sign must verify as "valid")
4. UB, the base key update algorithm In: current base key SKB t.r Out: new base key SKB (t+1).0 and the key update message SKU t 5 With respect to key update information, [DKXY02] define a scheme as having "secure key updates" if key update information sent for time period i can be computed from the signer's keys for time period i and i − 1. We find this requirement to be both too strong and too weak. It is too strong because it is quite possible that, while key update information cannot be computed from the signer's keys, it is no more useful than the two consecutive signer's keys. It is too weak, because it does not rule out the possibility for the adversary to forge signatures for two consecutive time periods if key update information is compromised. In fact, in [DKXY02] , if the number of signer compromises that the scheme resists is limited to c, then number of update information exposures is limited to only c/2.
6 Intuitively (and quite roughly), the first three correspond to the ordinary signatures; the first four correspond to forwardsecure ones, the first five (with some restrictions) correspond to key-insulated ones; and all seven are needed to provide the full power of the intrusion-resilient signatures.
7 As opposed to the other algorithms below, which are meant to be run by a single module (signer, verifier or base), it may be useful to implement the key generation algorithm as distributed between the signer and the home base modules, in such a way that corruption even during key generation does not fully compromise the scheme. Alternatively, key generation may be run by a trusted third party. For simplicity, we postpone this discussion until Section 3, where we propose a practical intermediate solution.
US, the signer update algorithm
In: current signer secret key SKS t.r and the key update message SKU Note that this definition implies that messages are processed by the signer in the same order in which they are generated by the base.
Differences from Prior Notions. If only Gen, Sign, Ver are used, then t.r and SKB can be ignored in these algorithms, and the above functional definition becomes that of an ordinary signature scheme.
Relaxing the above restrictions to also allow the use of US (while setting SKU t = 1 for all t), extends the definition to that of forward-secure signatures (or a "key-evolving" scheme [BM99] , to be more precise).
Functional definition of a "key-insulated" signature scheme [DKXY02] is obtained by further relaxing the restrictions to allow the use of UB as well (and thus removing SKU t = 1 restriction), but restricting SKB t = SKB , t for some secret SKB and for every period t (i.e. the base secret does not change).
Finally, our model is obtained by removing the remaining restrictions: allowing the base secret to vary and using RB, RS.
Security Definition
In order to formalize security, we need a notation for the number of refreshes in each period: Let RN (t) denote the number of times the keys are refreshed in the period t: i.e., there will be RN (t)+1 instances of signer and base keys. Recall that each update is immediately followed by a refresh; thus, keys with refresh index 0 are never actually used. RN is used only for notational convenience: it need not be known; security is defined below in terms of RN (among other parameters). Now, consider all the keys generated during the entire run of the signature scheme. They can be generated by the following "thought experiment" (we do not need to actually run it -it is used just for definitions).
Let SKS * , SKB * , SKU * and SKR * be the sets consisting of, respectively, signer and base keys and update and refresh messages, generated during the above experiment. We want these sets to contain all the secrets that can be directly stolen (as opposed to computed) by the adversary. Thus, we omit from these sets the keys SKS t.0 , SKB t.0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , SKU 0 and SKR 1.0 , which are never actually stored or sent (because key generation is immediately followed by update, and each update is immediately followed by refresh). Note that SKR t.0 for t > 1 is used (it is sent together with SKU t−1 to the signer), and thus is included into SKR * . To define security, let F , the adversary (or "forger"), be a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle Turing machine with the following oracles:
• Osig, the signing oracle (constructed using SKS * ), which on input (m, t, r) (1 ≤ t ≤ T , 1 ≤ r ≤ RN (t)) outputs Sign(SKS t.r , m)
• Osec, the key exposure oracle (based on the sets SKS * , SKB * , SKU * and SKR * ), which 1. on input ("s", t.r) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ r ≤ RN (t) outputs SKS t.r ; 2. on input ("b", t.r) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ r ≤ RN (t) outputs SKB t.r ; 3. on input ("u", t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 outputs SKU t and SKR t+1 .0; and 4. on input ("r", t.r) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ r < RN (t), outputs SKR t.r .
Queries to Osec oracle correspond to intrusions, resulting in the corresponding secrets exposures. Exposure of an update key SKU t−1 automatically exposes the subsequent refresh key SKR t.0 , because they are sent together in one message. Adversary's queries to Osig and Osec must have the t.r values within the appropriate bounds. It may be reasonable to require the adversary to "respect erasures" and prohibit a value that should have been erased from being queried (or used for signature computation). However, this restriction is optional, and in fact we do not require it here. Note, that respecting erasures is local to signer and base and is different from requiring any kind of global synchronization. For any set of valid key exposure queries Q, time period t ≥ 1 and refresh number r, 1 ≤ r ≤ RN (t), we say that key SKS t.r is Q-exposed :
[directly] if ("s", t.r) ∈ Q; or [via refresh] if r > 1, ("r", t.(r−1)) ∈ Q, and SKS t.(r−1) is Q-exposed; or [via update] if r = 1, ("u", t−1) ∈ Q, and SKS (t−1).RN (t−1) is Q-exposed.
Replacing SKS with SKB throughout the above definition yields the definition of base key exposure (or more precisely, of SKB t.r being Q-exposed ). Both definitions are recursive, with direct exposure as the base case.
Clearly, exposure of a signer key SKS t.r for the given t and any r enables the adversary to generate legal signatures for this period t. Similarly, simultaneous exposure of both base and signer keys (SKB t.r , SKS t.r , for some t, r) allows the adversary to run the algorithms of definition 2.1 to generate valid signatures for any messages for all later periods t ≥ t.
Thus, we say that the scheme is (t, Q)-compromised, if either
• SKS t.r is Q-exposed for some r, 1 ≤ r ≤ RN (t); or
• SKS t .r and SKB t .r are both Q-exposed for some t < t.
In other words, a particular time period has been rendered insecure if either the signer was broken into during that time period, or, during a previous time period, the signer and the base were compromised without a refresh in between. Note that update and refresh messages by themselves do not help the adversary in our model-they only help when combined, in unbroken chains, with signer or base keys.
8 If the scheme is (j, Q)-compromised, then clearly adversary, possessing the secrets returned by Osec in response to queries in Q, can generate signatures for the period t.
The following experiment captures adversary's functionality. Intuitively, adversary succeeds if she generates a valid signature without "cheating": not obtaining this signature from Osig, asking only legal queries (e.g. no out of bounds queries), and not compromising the scheme for the given time period. We call this adversary "adaptive" because she is allowed to decide which keys and signatures to query based on previous answers she receives.
Experiment Run-Adaptive-Adversary(F, k, T, RN ) Generate-Keys(k, T, RN ) (m, j, sig) ← F Osig,Osec (1 k , T, PK , RN ) Let Q be the set of key exposure queries F made to Osec; if Ver (m, j, sig) ="invalid" or (m, j) was queried by F to Osig or there was an illegal query or the scheme is (j, Q)-compromised then return 0 else return 1 We now define security for the intrusion resilient signature schemes.
Definition 2. Let SiBIR[k, T, RN ] be a signer-base key-evolving scheme with security parameter k, number of time periods T , and table RN of T refresh numbers. For adversary F , define adversary success function as
Let the insecurity function, denoted InSec IR−adaptive (SiBIR[k, T, RN ], τ, q sig ), be the maximum value of
) over all adaptive adversaries F that run in time at most τ and ask at most q sig signature queries.
Finally
Although the notion of (j, Q)-compromise depends only the set Q, it is important how Q is generated by the adversary. Allowing the adversary to decide her queries based on previous answers gives her potentially more power.
While we do not see an attack on our scheme in Sec. 3 by a fully adaptive adversary, the proof for such a strong adversary seems elusive. Instead, we consider two types of slightly restricted adversaries. The first type, which we call partially adaptive, is allowed to adaptively choose queries to Osig, but not to Osec. To be precise, the experiment Run-Adaptive-Adversary is modified Run-Partially-Adaptive-Adversary by requiring F to output the set Q of all her Osec queries before she makes any of them. The rest of the definitions remain the same, giving us InSec IR−partially−adaptive instead of InSec IR−adaptive . The second type of restricted adversary is partially synchronous. She may select all of her queries adaptively, but is not allowed to go back in time "too far." Specifically, upon querying any key in time period t, she is not allowed to query keys in time period t − 2 (note that the choice of 2 is arbitrary and can be replaced with another constant). This is a reasonable assumption in practice, essentially saying that the base, the network and the signer can be at most one time period apart at any given time. In order to formally define security against such an adversary, we simply expand the definition of "illegal queries" to encompass the above restriction. The rest of the definitions remain the same, giving us InSec 3 Intrusion-Resilient Scheme: Construction
Our scheme, which we call SiBIR1, is based on the [IR01] forward-secure signature scheme (which will call FSIG IR ). In turn, FSIG IR is based on the Guillou-Quisquater [GQ88] ordinary signature scheme. In fact, the [IR01] forward-secure scheme can be obtained from our scheme by simply eliminating the base, and setting all the messages that the signer expects equal to 1.
The scheme utilizes two security parameters, l and k. Let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l be a hash function (modeled in the security proof as a random oracle). In the interests of conciseness, we do not present the rationale behind FSIG IR here. We do, however, recall how keys are generated and updated in the FSIG IR scheme (utilizing our own notation, rather than notation used in [IR01] , in the interests of clarity)
Keys in FSIG IR . Both the public and the secret keys contain a modulus n = p 1 p 2 , where p 1 and p 2 are (k/2)-bit safe primes: p i = 2q i +1 such that q i are odd primes (such q i , satisfying 2q i +1 is prime, are known as Sophie Germain primes).
9 The public key also contains a value v ∈ Z * n . For each time period t, there is a 9 See [CS00] for an excellent discussion on efficient generation of safe primes and short primes.
corresponding (l+1)-bit exponent e t that the signer can easily compute (we require all the exponents to be relatively prime; then they need not be stored in the public key, but rather the appropriate e t is included in each signature-see [IR01] for further details). Messages during time period t are signed using the secret value s t , such that s et t ≡ 1/v (mod n). The factorization of n must be erased after key generation in order to achieve forward security. Knowledge of secrets s t , s t+1 , . . . , s T , is equivalent (by the so-called " Shamir Key generation and update in SiBIR1. We use essentially the same keys in SiBIR1. However, in order to achieve intrusion-resilience, s [t,T ] is never stored explicitly. Rather, it is shared multiplicatively between the signer and the base. The signer stores s [t,T ] and the base stores
. This multiplication is never explicitly performed: instead, the signer computes s t = s
, the base computes
, and the two values are multiplied together to obtain s t . Following the conventions that key generation is immediately followed by key update, the first signer secret key contains blanks for s 0 and e 0 . We note that, in actual implementation, it will be more efficient to combine the first key generation and update.
Also, following the convention that the only "storage" available to the base and the signer is the secret key, we store some values in the secret key that need not really be secret, such as the current time period and the information needed to regenerate the e t values. The only values that the signer needs to keep secret are s t,T and s t ; the only values that the base needs to keep secret are b t,T .
Finally, note that key generation and update algorithms do not affect the refresh index, so we omit it in Figures 1 and 2 in order to simplify notation.
Generate a modulus n: Generate random ( k/2 − 1)-bit primes q 1 , q 2 s.t. p i = 2q i + 1 are both prime n ← p 1 p 2 Generate exponents:
Generate primes e i s.t. 2 l (1 + (i − 1)/T ) ≤ e i < 2 l (1 + i/T ) for i = 1, 2, . . . , T (Some seed E can be used with H to generate these e 1 , . . . , e T . This E might need to be stored for later regeneration of e 1 , . . . , e T .) Distributing Key Generation. Most of the key generation algorithm can be easily split between the signer and the base. Namely, once the shared modulus n is generated and given to both parties (without factoring), the base can generate b [1,T ] that can be combined to compute the public key. The shares themselves can be made public without adversely affecting security. Thus, the amount of cooperation required during key generation is minimal.
The same modulus n can be used by multiple signature schemes. In particular, our signature scheme can be made identity-based if a third party is trusted to take roots modulo n of the identity v.
Regenerate e t+1 , . . . , e T using E s t+1 ← s Refresh. Because the signer and the base share a single value multiplicatively, the refresh algorithm presented in Figure 3 is quite simple: the base divides its share by a random value, and signer multiplies its share by the same value. Recall that each update is immediately followed by refresh (and, in fact, update and refresh information can be sent by the base to the signer in one message).
Figure 3: Key refresh algorithms Signing and Verifying. Figure 4 describes our signature and verification algorithms. They are exactly the same as in the forward-secure signature scheme of [IR01] . Again, we omit the refresh index on the signer's key for ease of notation.
Variations. Our scheme can be easily modified (with no or minimum increase in storage requirement!) to "re-charge" the signer for more than one time period at a time. To enable the signer to compute s t1 , s t1+1 , . . . s t2 , the base simply needs to send the signer
. In fact, it is easy to extend this method to non-contiguous time periods. This feature may have interesting applications for delegation (including self-delegation).
Another simple modification of our scheme can yield forward-secure threshold and proactive scheme (similar to, but more efficient than, the scheme of [AMN01] ). Efficiency for the verifier and for each of the modules participating in the signing will be essentially the same as for the regular Guillou-Quisquater scheme.
algorithm SiBIR1.Ver (M, PK , (z, σ, t, e)) %same as IR.Ver in [IR01] Let PK = (n, v, T ) if e ≥ 2 l (1 + t/T ) or e < 2 l or e is even then return 0 if z ≡ 0 (mod n) then return 0 y ← z e v σ mod n if σ = H(t, e, y , M ) then return 1 else return 0 
Security

Complexity Assumption
We use a variant of the strong RSA assumption (introduced in [BP97] and [FO97] , our variant is identical to the one in [IR01] ), which postulates that it is hard to compute any root of a fixed value modulo a composite integer. More precisely, the strong RSA assumption states that it is intractable, given n that is a product of two primes and a value α in Z * n , to find β ∈ Z * n and r > 1 such that β r = α. In our version, we restrict ourselves to the moduli that are products of so-called "safe" primes (a safe prime is one of the form 2q + 1, where q itself is a prime). Note that, assuming safe primes are frequent, this restriction does not strengthen the assumption. Second, we upperbound the permissible values or r by 2 l+1 , where l is a security parameter for our scheme (in an implementation, l will be significantly shorter than the length k of the modulus n).
More formally, let A be an algorithm. Consider the following experiment.
Experiment Break-Strong-RSA(k, l, A) Randomly choose two primes q 1 and q 2 of length k/2 − 1 each such that 2q 1 + 1 and 2q 2 + 1 are both prime. p 1 ← 2q 1 + 1; p 2 ← 2q 2 + 1; n ← p 1 p 2 Randomly choose α ∈ Z * n . (β, r) ← A(n, α) If 1 < r ≤ 2 l+1 and β r ≡ α (mod n) then return 1 else return 0 Let Succ SRSA (A, k, l) = Pr[Break-Strong-RSA(k, l, A) = 1]. Let the "insecurity function" InSec SRSA (k, l, τ ) be the maximum of Succ SRSA (A, k, l) over all the adversaries A who run in expected time at most τ . Our assumption is that InSec SRSA (k, l, τ ), for τ polynomial in k, is negligible in k. The smaller the value of l, of course, the weaker the assumption.
In fact, for a sufficiently small l, our assumption follows from a variant of the fixed-exponent RSA assumption. Namely, assume that there exists a constant such that, for every r, the probability of computing, in expected time τ , an r-th root of a random integer modulo a k-bit product of two safe primes, is at most 2 −k . Then, InSec SRSA (k, l, τ ) < 2 l+1−k , which is negligible if l = o(k ).
Security Proof
Our security proof is more complex that the one of [IR01] , although the two proofs are quite similar. Both are based on the forking lemma of [PS96] .
Theorem 1 For any τ , q sig , and q hash , InSec IR−partially−adaptive (SiBIR1[k, l, T, RN ]; t, q sig , q hash ) ≤ T (q hash + 1)InSec SRSA (k, l, τ ) + 2 −l+1 T (q hash + 1) + 2 2−k q sig (q hash + 1) , where τ = 4τ + O(lT (l 2 T 2 + k 2 )).
A similar theorem also holds for partially synchronous adversary. The proofs of these theorems will be given in the full version of the paper.
Active Attacks
Because information flows only from the base to the signer, the adversary's only possible active attack is to send a bad SKR or SKU value to the signer. An active attacker can thus always prevent signatures from being issued. While our definition does not consider active attacks for the sake of simplicity, in our implementation in Section 3, the active adversary cannot do anything worse that merely sabotage the system. It is easy to show that, in terms of forging new signatures, its powers are no greater than those of a passive attacker who merely obtains SKR and SKU values.
